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CURRENT ITEMS THE THEORY OF CHANGE AND RESPONSE IN MODERN DEMOGRAPHIC HISTORY
The process of demographic change and response is not only continuous but also reflexive and behavioralreflexive in the sense that a change in one component is eventually altered by the change it has induced in other components; behavioral in the sense that the process involves human decisions in the pursuit of goals with varying means and conditions. As a consequence, the subject has a frightening complexity-so much so that the temptation is great to escape from its intricacies.
One method of escape is to eschew any comprehensive theory, simply describing computations or working on a single hypothesis at a time. Another is to adopt some convenient oversimplification, such as the assumption that population is simply a matter of two capacities-a "reproductive urge" on the one side and 'means of subsistence" on the other-or, at an opposite extreme, that demographic behavior is a function of a 'traditional culture' or 'value system." My purpose here is to try to encompass some of the complexities in an overall analysis of demographic change in the industrialized countries. To do this, I prefer to start with Japan. Not only does Japan, the sole fully industrialized non-Western country, furnish a perspective that no other country can furnish, but some phases of its population change are statistically better documented.
Abortion as a Demographic Response
The phenomenon most discussed-and one commonly regarded as peculiarly Japanese--is the rapid rise of the registered abortion rate from 11.8 per 1000 women aged 15-49 in 1949 to a peak of 50.2 per 1000 in 1955,/1 although at the latter date the registration of abortions is estimated to have been only 50 to 75 per cent complete./2
The resort to abortion has been the leading cause of probably the fastest drop in the birth rate ever exhibited by an entire nation, births per 1000 women aged 10-49 falling by 41 per cent between 1950 and 1957. Westerners profess to be astonished by this phenomenon, but they should not be. The behavior of the Japanese is essentially the same in kind as the behavior of West Europeans at a similar time in their social and demographic history. The main difference is that Japanese tolerance permits the abortion rate to be reasonably well known, whereas in the past of Europe the abortion rate has never been known and, for this reason, is usually ignored in population theory. If, then, abortion was once a widespread practice in the most advanced countries of Western Europe, if it is now widespread in Eastern Europe, where it is legal and subject to record, and where economic development is behind that of Western Europe, there is no reason to regard the resort to abortion as peculiarly Japanese. It is not an outgrowth of ancient tradition in Tokugawa times; not an outgrowth of the absence of Christian ideology. It is a response to social and economic conditions arising in country after country at a particular time in the process of modernization. The fact that abortion was not safe earlier in the century shows how determined the people of northwest Europe were in their reproductive control. Now that it is reasonably safe when legalized,/8 it is an effective means of family limitation for Hungary and Poland as well as for Japan.
If Western prudery and Oriental realism have led to an exaggeration of the role of abortions in Japan, this tendency has been helped by a statistical illusion. Not only have abortions increased as births have fallen, but the sum of births and registered abortions for each year yields a combined rate per 1000 population that has changed little during the big fertility drop (Table 1 )./9 This seems to say that an abortion was responsible for each birth saved. Actually, of course, abortions can and do occur much more frequently than births can./10
Other factors must therefore have played a role in Japan's falling birth rate.
Other Responses in Japan
One such factor was contraception. Irene Taeuber points out that this practice increased rapidly after 1950 although abortions were available, Table 2 ). The shift for men was also drastic. Indeed, it may be that the age at marriage rose faster in Japan than in any other country in history. By 1959 the nation had a marital age higher than that of most Western countries (Table 3 ). In the United States in that year nearly half the brides in first marriages were under 20, but in Japan only one-nineteenth of them were that young. However, the Japanese concentrate their marriages more heavily in the modal ages-20-24 for brides and 25-29 for grooms-than Western countries do, as Table 3 shows. Table 4 ). It looks as though the age at marriage is flexible in Japan, but not the decision to marry or not to Nor were the people influenced in their behavior by concern about national 'overpopulation," for they let their government proclaim a policy of population expansion during the "Co-prosperity" era. In short, an explanation of the vigorous Japanese response to sustained natural increase must account for the antagonism between such increase and prosperity, in terms of behavior prompted by personal rather than national goals.
Was the Northwest European Response Similar? Since the northwest European countries, years ahead of Japan, also had a sustained natural increase, did they manifest a similar multiphasic response? The answer is undeniably yes. Although generally overlooked because of our preoccupation with the contraceptive issue, the fact is that every country in northwest Europe reacted to its persistent excess of births over deaths with virtually the entire range of possible responses.
Regardless of nationality, language, and religion, each industrializing nation tended to postpone marriage, to increase celibacy, to resort to abortion, to practice contraception in some form, and to emigrate overseas.
The timing and relative importance of the reactions were not identical in the various countries, and of course methods could not be used that were not then technically feasible for the public at large (e.g., harmless sterilization); but the remarkable thing is that all of the northwest European countries reacted, that they did so in each case with the reappearance of the whole range of responses, and that virtually the entire panorama was later repeated in Japan.
That the stimulus was also similar to that in Japan is clear. Our three Scandinavian countries in Fig. 1 reached a high plateau of natural increase around 1815 and sustained it for more than a hundred years. Since the plateau was reached long before a significant drop in the birth rate occurred, there were about six decades of what was then an unprecedented rate of human multiplication-sufficient to double the population every 61 years in the absence of emigration-before the birth rate began visibly to fall around 1870, and it took another 30 years or so before the drop in fertility could move fast enough to gain on the steadily falling mortality. Periods of substantial increase had of course been known before, but they were brief and virtually self-correcting, since each time the death rate would soon rise again and wipe out the gain. What was unprecedented in northwest Europe was that self-correction was avoided so long over such a wide region. But, as we have seen, the northwest Europeans and Japanese bestirred themselves in the face of prolonged natural increase without being goaded to do so by rising poverty. The answer to the central question about modern demographic history cannot be posed, then, in the framework of ordinary population theory, which assumes the sole "population factor" to be some relation between the population-resources ratio and the collective level of living. It is doubtful that any question about demographic behavior can be satisfactorily posed in such terms, because human beings are not motivated by the population-resources ratio even when they know about it (which is seldom).
My own view is that no society has been geared to a sustained high rate of natural increase except by conquest. Under a prolonged drop in mortality with industrialization, people in northwest Europe and Japan found that their accustomed demographic behavior was handicapping them in their effort to take advantage of the opportunities being provided by the emerging economy. They accordingly began changing their behavior. Thus it was in a sense the rising prosperity itself, viewed from the standpoint of the individual's desire to get ahead and appear respectable, that forced a modification of his reproductive behavior.
Mortality decline impinged on the individual by enlarging his family. Unless something were done to offset this effect, it gave him, as a child, more siblings with whom to share whatever derived from his parents as well as more likelihood of reckoning with his parents for a longer period of life; and, as an adult, it gave him a more f ragmented and more delayed share of the patrimony with which to get married and found his own family, while at the same time it saddled him, in founding that family, with the task of providing for more children-for rearing them, educating them, endowing their marriages, etc.,-in a manner assuring them a status no lower than his. The obligations of marriage and expanded parenthood were not easy, as Banks has shown so convincingly for nineteenth century Britain, /20 in a changing society where one's position was threatened from every side and where one's children had to acquire new and costly forms of education. The parentneeded to conserve some means for himself, because of longer life-expectancy and because of the importance of capital for seizingopportunitiesorstavingoff disaster inthe fluid situation of the times.
The inappropriateness of the old demographic behavior was not confined to one segment of society, such as the a middle class" or the towns and cities. Nor was it characteristic of some societies and not others. Whenever and wherever mortality declined on a sustained basis, there the continuation of old demographic patterns brought a train of disadvantages.
Readjustments in the Agricultural Areas
Our view receives an acid test, for example, with respect to the peasantry, because a central tenet of population theory is that farmers lag behind other classes in altering their demographic behavior. We note, however, that the explanations given for this alleged fact are mutually contradictory. On the one hand, it is commonly taken for granted that no adjustment is made by farmers because none is needed: agrarian societies can assimilate natural increase indefinitely, because "children are an asset on the farm." This makes thefarmer's unchanging reproductive behavior purely rational. However, it is hard to avoid seeing that a sustained natural increase in a delimited farming area will eventually mean "too many people for the land." This much granted, the theorist may explain ruraldemographic slowness by saying that farmers feel children to be an asset on the farm. Now, however, the farmer is no longer rational but irrational, and one must find an explanation for his stupidity. This is easy if one assumes that peasants are "traditional intheir attitudes.' By this route we are led to feel it is natural for modern attitudes and practices to begin in the cities and "diffuse' gradually to the countryside. Such thinking appears to be a case of a non-existent fact being "explained' by a plethora of unsubstantiated reasons. In Japan and northwest Europe, population increase was especially hard on the peasantry, with the consequence that their reaction was especially drastic. The structure of the rural societies was such that they could accommodate permanently growing populations only on one assumption-territorial expansion. Technological improvement provided no accommodation, because it called for fewer rather than more workers. As capital was increasingly applied to agriculture and the optimum size of farm unit rose, a young man found it more difficult, rather than less, to acquire what was necessary in agriculture to guarantee a satisfactory social status.
Prolonged Natural Increase, Inheritance, and Agriculture. In the absence of long-run natural increase, there is no general problem of rural inheritance. The few parents with numerous surviving offspring are fortunate, for they have not only the child labor but also the eventual oldage security that children can furnish. Their children can receive enough land or substance to marry at a normal age, because each large family is matched by families that have died out entirely or have had only one child survive. Naturally, land and goods flow from the dead to the living in several ways-by purchase prior to death, by collateral relatives in the absence of true heirs, by remarriage of widows--and so large families acquire the means to endow their children for marriage. Without population growth, then, the demographic inequalities of one generation are ironed out in the next. There is no general problem of inheritance but only a problem for an occasional family that has lost out by ineptitude or has no heirs because of misfortune.
When, however, there is a sustained high rate of natural increase, inheritance becomes a chronic problem. Since the proportion of families with numerous surviving children is now muchhigher, these families are not matched by others that have land but few or no survivors. As a consequence, if their children are given land to marry with, the size of the farm will be reduced; if they are given cash or goods, its capital will be denuded. The parents are reluctant to do either, because they also have to live and, given their now greater life-expectancy, they hang on to the land until much later in the life of the offspring. Young people are forced to postpone marriage, and some toforego it altogether. Thus the strictly agrarian system has very little capacity to absorb population increase. This inability, be it noted, has nothing to do with 'the inheritance system." The latter is concerned solely with the matter of discrimination among potentialheirs, whereas our concern is with the growth of the total number of potential heirs (all with their social expectations) in relation to the resources available in agriculture. If there are more heirs than can be accommodated at the expected standard of living with the land available, no inheritance system can itself alter this fact. It can at best decide who gets hurt and who does not. In other words, if there is no sustained natural increase in a settled agrarian area, any system of inheritance will work. If the opposite is the case, then no inheritance system will work, unless, of course, there is some real solution available. Despite the vogue of inheritance systems in population theory, it is doubtful that they play any determinative role in demographic change. Rather, they simply reflect whatever demographic solutions are developed in the society. This view is strengthened when one realizes that fixed and rigid inheritance systems are figments of the social scientist's imagination. They are not something "laid on,' which the people follow in the fashion of automatons; rather, they are fashioned and modified as changing conditions and interests demand.
"Traditionalism" and Agrarian Demographic Response. If historically the peasant communities of Japan and western Europe experienced a sustained natural increase, did they fail to respond successfully because "the peasant was wedded to his traditional value system' ? To say so is to commit not only a factual error, as we shall see in a moment, but also a tautology. An explanation in terms of 'tradition" has no value in social science, because "tradition" is merely a name for absence of change. A type of social behavior is like the momentum of a moving body: it will not change unless something forces it to change. If the absence of a contrary force is itself not explained, we have no real theory of the persistence but merely another name for it. As for the so-called values, they should be recognized as being a part, or aspect, of the behavior itself and, accordingly, as requiring to be explained rather than being used as the explanation. The fact that people migrate is not explained by their favorable evaluation of migration. By definition, nobody does anything voluntary without some purpose, however vague, in mind. The question of change or persistence is therefore a question of what did or did not act upon the total action (motive-plus-conduct).
In other words, to say that fertility continues to be high in some group because of the group's "high-fertility values" is like saying that birds fly because they have wings.
In the case of the European peasantry, however, the alleged fact to be explained-a lack of demographic response-is itself not true. The demographic behavior of the rural population did change, and it changed drastically, because it had to. The common assumption to the contrary seems to arise from our parochial tendency to ignore all changes except the reduction of marital fertility by contraception. If contraception was not at first adopted on a major scale in most of the agrarian sectors, it was because ready alternatives were available. One of these was migration. As the economic revolution advanced, the rural sections found in the rising cities an ever expanding outlet for their excess natural increase-an outlet that helped them to capitalize on the opportunities offered by continued industrialization.
Indeed, as we know, in all of the industrializing countries rural-urban migration removed not only the farmers' natural increase but also a substantial portion of the base population as well. In Japan, for example, Irene Taeuber estimates that, without migration, the rural population of 45.9 million in 1920 would have reached 62.6 million by 1940 instead of the actual 45.5 million./21
The significance of rural-urban migration is that it involves a shift of occupation as well as residence. In fact, members of a farm family can leave agriculture, either part-time or fulltime, without ever leaving home./L2
The best indicator of rural migratory adjustment is therefore the diminution of the agricultural labor force. In Great Britain the greatest number of men employed in agriculture was 1.8 million in 1851. A hundred years later, when the total population was nearly 2-1/2 times as great as in 1851, the agricultural male labor force was down to 1.1 million./23
In Japan the population employed in agriculture, given as 15.7 million in 1876,/24 was 13.7 million in 1958/25 when the total population was more than 2-1/2 times greater. Daughters often left the countryside in greater abundance than sons. Village girls in Japan went to work in cities as maids or in factories and shops, typically remaining away for six years, often saving enough to get married either upon returning home or while remaining in distant towns and cities./26
Thus it can hardly be said that rural population in industrializing countries made no demographic response. They responded to sustained natural increase by the drastic process of removing it. Their failure to feature contraception and abortion was not due to 'traditional attitudes" (mass migration out of agriculture was not "traditional" either) but to the availability of an alternative which fitted the interests and structure of peasant families in the evolving economy.
The critical moment in the peasant family-cycle, especially in northwest Europe, was the time when the surviving young people were to get married. Up until then their labor was useful on the farms and their consumption limited; but, if they were to marry, they had to have the means (i.e., adequate land) to support a family in a fully adult, independent, and respectable manner. The common process by which reproduction was brought into equilibrium with the agrarian economy was the postponement or hastening of marriage according to the socially defined scarcity or abundance of land. With a prolonged decline in mortality, there were more claimants to land for marriage and a greater reluctance on the part of elders to give it up; but the same progressive forces in the society which were bringing the mortality decline were also opening up opportunities for employment in non-agricultural sectors. The decision to stay in agriculture or to seize these new opportunities was made in the young person's life at about the same time as the marital decision. Indeed, the two decisions-whether to postpone marriage and whether to leave agriculture-were doubtless often made jointly. Leaving agriculture might be the only hope for getting married-as in the case of Japanese girls who had to have a dowry. Migration out of agriculture was thus an adjustment that was congruent with the response-pattern already built into the rural social structure. This adjustment would not have been available, however, if it had not fitted into and aided the trend of the larger economy. Since industrialization by its very nature requires an exodus from agriculture,/27 the fact that economic development was occurring is proof enough that ruralurban migration was being rewarded. Many a farm got desperately needed capital, many a farm-boy or farm-girl achieved matrimony, because of receipts from the city. The adjustment of Japanese and European peasants was clearly not a descent into grim poverty and senseless subdivision; it was not a 'resistance to the forces of modernization" in the name of a 'traditional value system." It was, on the contrary, a utilization of the new opportunities of the economic revolution.
Delayed Marriage, a Continued Rural Response. The rural populations of industrializing nations did not respond to sustained natural increase by one means alone. In addition to out-migration, they adopted their old mechanism-postponement of marriage-to the new exigences, particularly in regions remote from urban centers. They did this, of course, not as a deliberate effort to reduce fertility or to solve the population problem, but as a response to the complexity and insecurity of the new requirements for respectable adult status under changing circumstances. In Japan, as noted already, a dowry was required for a girl's marriage. Her farm family, short on land and long on surviving members, needed cash more than it needed girl-power. Japanese factories and offices, on the other hand, needed cheap labor. It was therefore advantageous all around for rural girls to work under supervision, have their salaries returned home, and delay marriage for several years./28 As a consequence, the age at marriage rose almost as fast in the rural areas of Japan as it did in the urban./29 In neither sector was postponement a response to deepening poverty. Agriculture, as well as the total economy, was increasing in productivity./30 In all sectors of the economy, then, families had to grasp the new opportunities of the evolving society or else face relative loss of social status and consumption. Their chances were not improved by demographic behavior that permitted the large family size made possible by declining mortality. Forgetting the possibility of increased yields,/35 one tends to view such declines as the consequence of some "inheritance system" or as simply an indication of population pressure and deepening poverty; but they can more properly be viewed, in my opinion, partly as the maintenance of the same product per family with less land and partly as the consequence of a one-or two-generation lag of the adjustment mechanism behind the lowered mortality.
That the adjustment mechanisms were there is evident in the twenty Polish villages. As can be seen in line 3 of Table 5 , the number of children born per mother, during roughly the period 1872 to 1914, was almost twice on the largest farms what it was on the smallest.
This positive association between completed fertility The European peasants' response to sustained naturalincrease clearly reflected a social structure that held married couples responsible for their children. This feature-along with its corollary, postponement of marriage for those incapable of supporting children--was part of the independence and separateness accorded the nuclear family, as opposed to the joint household, in west European society. As such, it went back to medieval and post-medieval times;/37 and it tended to yield a later age at marriage than is found in most joint household systems. It did not necessarily produce a late marital age, however, because, with high mortality, individuals so unfortunate as to have to marry late were balanced by those lucky enough to marry early. When, in the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, the rural areas were faced with a natural increase unprecedented in its size and duration, postponement of marriage appeared as one of the adjustments. This was by no means the only adjustment that enabled the peasants to avoid subdividing land to the point of severe poverty and resurgent mortality.
In addition, the peasants maximized migration off the farm, increased permanent celibacy, and curtailed reproduction in the later years of marriage (probably by abortion, folk-contraception, and abstinence). Since, owing to the accelerating economic transformation, rural-urban migration became increasingly available, the forces tending to depress fertility, especially marital fertility, did not need to act so strongly as they did in towns and cities. In the latter places, migration out of agriculture was obviously not a possible alternative. The city-dweller's "migration" into a more lucrative occupation was mainly by acquiring education, skill, experience, and contacts-none of which was helped by animprovident marriage or a high marital fertility. His solution lay more in the direction of contraception and abortion, to which he had better access than the peasant.
Ireland as a Test Case
If correct, our analysis should hold not only for the different social classes but also for the various countries of northwest Europe, even in cases that are commonly regarded as demographically unique. Ireland, for example, is habitually cited as a country having in modern times a population history unlike that of any other nation. Not only did she experience a pronounced decline in population while her neighbors were all showing an unprecedented increase, but she exhibited a tendency toward late marriage and celibacy that strikes many observers as peculiar. On the assumption of uniqueness, particularistic explanations of her demographic history have been given-e.g. that it is a result of the Irish famine, the "land" situation, or extreme religious zeal./38
But how unique is Ireland?
It is certainly not unique in having a marital age that was comparatively late to begin with and which grew later in the last half of the nineteenth century. In 1830-40 Irish women married reasonably early for Europeans: the proportion of brides who were under 21 was 28.1 per cent; under 26, it was 66.5 per cent-both proportions similar to those in England and Wales./39
The Irish age at marriage evidently rose after that, reaching its highest point about 1911, at which time it started gradually down, as- Table 6 shows. By 1957 the average age at marriage for Irish women was 27.6, only two years above the figure of 25.6 years for women in England and Wales./40
If the late age at marriage in Ireland is to be explained, it must therefore be explained in terms applicable to northwest Europe as a whole. In seventeen countries of that region around 1950, the proportion of brides at first marriage who were age 25 or older was 39. Granted that Ireland is part of the late-marrying wing of northwest Europe, one may explain this fact as due to her Roman Catholicism. But for five Catholic countries of the region,/41 the average percentage of first-brides aged 25-plus was 40.4, as compared to 39.1 for ten nonCatholic countries. Even if Catholicism were involved in Irish marital postponement, how would it be? It would certainly not be because the church has an injunction against early marriage. The usual interpretation is that the church defines marriage as second best, and hence gives no powerful encouragement to early marriage; but Belgium, an eminently Catholic country, has an earlier age at first marriage for females than does Norway, Sweden, or Scotland.
The way to understand Ireland's demographic career is hardly in such particularistic terms.
Fascination with her late marriage should not blind us to the fact that she responded to long-continued natural increase by other means as well. She responded by permanent celibacy, for example, and here again Ireland was not an isolated case but rather an extreme exemplification of the northwest European pattern, itself extreme. In 1951 some 24.7 percent of the Irish women aged 45 or more had never been married. In 1950 the Icelandic figure was 21.5 per cent; the Norwegian and the Scottish, 20.9. The degree to which Europe stands out can be seen from the following: One should note, of course, that a shift to a later age at marriage, other things equal, will independently bring a reduction in marital fertility by pushing a greater part of the marital exposure into the less fecund years of the reproductive span. It will cause an additional loss through the greater proportion of women who die before marrying. For these reasons the influence of a shift in the age at marriage is greater than the simple proportion of the reproductive years added or eliminated.
if, then, Ireland exhibited a multiphasic response similar to that shown by her neighbors, differing from theirs only in the relative emphasis placed on the various means and in its vigor-so drastic that it halved the absolute population within 80 years-the explanation must be in terms applicable to the rest of the region. A significant fact is that Ireland was, and has to a considerable degree remained, a rural part of northwest Europe. It was a rural backland when it belonged to Great Britain, and after its independence in 1922 it was cut off from its most industrial section, the northern six counties--much as if Mississippi, Arkansas, and Louisiana were given their independence but with New Orleans and the rest of the Gulf Coast removed. A late age at marriage, as we have seen, was particularly characteristic of rural northwest Europe; and in Ireland it prevailed more in the rural areas than in the towns. Ireland's continued rurality, together with the circumstance that Catholicism became a symbol and rallying point of Irish Nationalism as against the Protestant British, enabled the Catholic clergy to remain strong. Being in control to an unusual degree, the celibate clergy could implement its ascetic supervision over courtship and instill its negative attitude toward marriage, including state enforcement of the indissolubility of wedlock. It thus gave its blessing to marital postponement and lay celibacy, and at the same time kept down illegitimate fertility. Concomitantly, the exceptional power of the clergy tended, as in other Catholic countries, to discourage economic development and thus to keep the area rural.
As an agrarian region, Ireland partook of the exodus out of agriculture that accompanies modern economic development-except that, without economic development in its own territory, the migration out of agriculture was simultaneously a migration out of Ireland. In other words, international and overseas migration and rural-urban migration were one and the same thing for Ireland. The lack of economic opportunity at home powerfully discouraged marriage, while ecclesiastical determination of family, criminal, customs, and censorship laws made abortions, contraceptive materials, and birth control information and services difficult to obtain. Marriage tended to be postponed not only because the economic requirements for it were hard to secure, not only because it could not be dissolved if it proved personally obnoxious, but also because it was likely to lead to several children. In addition, clerical control, poor economic development, and rural community opinion worked together to discourage married women from entering the labor force, thus reducing still more the economic support for marriage. Recently the proportion of married women aged 15 to 65 in paid employment was less than 3 per cent, as compared to about 23 per cent in England and Wales./44
Ireland thus manifests a combination of the demographic responses of Europe, extreme in its totality and in its result but composed of familiar strands indeed, all understandable under the circumstances.
It thus illustrates the principle that the explanation of as fundamental a feature of society as its demographic changes is not to be found in some inflexible biological or economic law or in some particularistic cultural idiosyncrasy, but rather in the main features of the operating social organization on the one hand and, on the other, in the changing conditions which arise from past performance and the altering internationalpolitico-economic environment.
Conclusion
My thesis is that, faced with a persistent high rate of natural increase resulting from past success in controlling mortality, families tended to use every demographic means possible to maximize their new opportunities and to avoid relative loss of status.
An understanding of this process in population theory has been hindered by a failure to see the multiphasic character of the response and by an interpretation of demographic behavior as a response either to absolute need or to some cultural idiosyncracy such as a particular "value system" or "custom." When the demographic history of industrialized nations is analyzed comparatively, an amazing similarity of the response syndrome seems to me to emerge. An explanation of a country's demographic behavior by reference to a peculiarity or accident of its culture fails to cope with this basic similarity of response. Curiously, we do not adopt such an easy way out with respect to mortality. We do not "explain" India's high death rate and Sweden's low death rate by saying that the one "values" high mortality and the other low mortality. Yet we sometimes come perilously close to this in regard to other aspects of human demography, especially fertility.
As for the view that the motivational linkage between change and response depends on fear of absolute poverty, we have seen that it fails to account for the fact that the multiphasic effort to reduce population growth occurs simultaneously with a spectacular economic growth. Fear of hunger as a principal motive may fit some groups in an extreme stage of social disorganization or at a particular moment of crisis, but it fits none with which I am familiar and certainly none of the advanced peoples of western Europe and Japan. The fear of invidious deprivation apparently has greater force, and hence the absolute level of living acts more as an environmental condition than as a subjective stimulus.
If each family is concerned with its prospective standing in comparison to other families within its reference group, we can understand why the peoples of the industrializing and hence prospering countries altered their demographic behavior in numerous ways that had the effect of reducing the population growth brought about by lowered mortality. 
